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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this paper is to offer some guidelines for an explanation of politeness in the 
framework of Relevance Theory. I will suggest that the notion of social adequacy is to be 
preferred to that of strategy; as a primitive for politeness theory, and try to show how such 
a notion can be integrated into a cognitive model. Some aspects concerning the status of 
politeness will be then considered under the light of Wilson & Sperber's (1993) 
distinctions: whether (or in which sense) it is an implicature, whether (or in which sense) 
it is communicated, whether (or in which sense) it is relevant. The predictions that emerge 
from adopting this point of view make it possible to provide a detailed and consistent 
account of politeness manoeuvres and effects. 
1. Introduction 
Politeness has become one of the fields of research to which more attention has been 
devoted in the last two decades. The connections of politeness studies with other domains, 
such as sociolinguistics and socio-pragmatics, ethnography of communication, second 
language teaching/acquisition or conversation analysis, have definitely contributed to this 
growing interest. Politeness theories and cognitive pragmatics, on the other hand, did not 
seem to have had an affinity for each other.' This initial situation, however, has radically 
changed in the last few years, and several attempts to explain social aspects of 
communication from a cognitive perspective have been made.2 
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The aim of this paper is to contribute some ideas for this rapprochement by considering an 
explanation of politeness in the framework of Relevance Theory (hereinafter, RT), a model 
of verbal commurúcation in which cognition plays a central role. I will begin by discussing 
what is politeness. Then, I will sketch the lines along which a picture can be drawn of 
politeness phenomena in relevance-theoretic terms. Finally, I will briefly comment on some 
consequences of adopting such an approach. 
2. On the nature of politeness 
2.1. What is politeness? 
From social deixis to indirect speech acts, from conventional formulae to conversational 
strategies, from tact to friendliness, too many different things seem to have been bundled 
under a single label: indeed, politeness usually covers such a variety of phenomena that no 
consistent characterisation seems to be within reach. 
In fact, in the standard meaning of the word polite at least three dimensions can be 
identified: 1) polite as civil or socially correct; 2) polite as kind or friendly; and 3) polite as 
tactful or diplomatic. A quick look at the literature easily shows that different researchers 
have favoured different senses. Echoing Fraser (1990), one could say that for Leech (1983) 
being polite involves making the hearer to 'feel good' {polite as friendly); to Brown & 
Levinson (1987) it means making lüm not 'feel bad' {polite as diplomatic);3 for Fraser 
himself it is 'the expected state' (polite as socially correct).4 
Although pointing in opposite directions, both Leech's and Brown & Levinson's 
frameworks share a crucial property: they put the stress on the "functional" or strategic 
nature of politeness,5 against the 'old-fashioned' view that politeness is merely a set of 
arbitrary social conventions. Also the commondistinction between 'positive politeness' and 
'negative politeness' as the two sides of any politeness system emphasises the idea that the 
efforts made to show appreciation for the addressee or to avoid any intrusión into his 
legitímate privacy are the only constítutive parts of politeness. 
However, a central issue seems to be missing from fhese approaches. Conversational 
strategies,6 or conversational efforts, can only have their raison d'étre as exploitations of 
a default, 'unmarked' behaviour. Put in other words, being able to prevent undesirable 
results or to enhance positive effects entail having first a precise knowledge of expected 
courses of events (including, obviously, linguistic events and behaviour), and their social 
consequences. If so, politeness must primarily be a matter of social adequacy, estabüshed 
in terms of expectations. And any sort of conversational manoeuvres used to achieve a 
particular aim will be necessarily derived, since they will be dependent on strategic plans 
assuming default or expected effects. Thus, although analysing strategic moves is a 
significant part of a theory of politeness, only social adequacy can be a primitive notion. 
Therefore, I am assuming an approach to politeness roughly along the lines of Fraser 
(1990:232): 
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"... upon entering into agiven conversation eachparty brings anunderstanding of some 
initial sets of rights and obligations thatwill determine, at least for the preliminary stages, 
what the participants can expect from the other(s)."7 
"The status, the power and the role of each speaker, and the nature of circumstances" 
are, according to Fraser (1990: 232), the relevant parameters for calculating the initial set 
of rights and obligations. They "play a crucial role in determining what messages may be 
expected both in terms of form and content." 
Status, power or social role are indeed basic notions to define social relationships. But 
there seems to be something unique to them and to social categorisation. Ordinary 
categorisation uses perception as its inain source of data; social categorisation, by contrast, 
usually has to invoke elements and establish relationships with no direct perceptual 
motivation. Most of our social activities depend on created categoríes (such as profession, 
role or friendship), which are defined through social convention and do not necessarily 
relate to any essential or perceptible property of the individual. This fact strongly suggests 
that social cognition should be considered as a specific, sepárate domain or faculty.8 
On the other hand, if defining factors depend ultimately on convention, a 
straightforward prediction will be that different cultures will presuraably produce different 
created categories. Status, power, distance, social role or face, as abstract notions, are 
universal; buttheir particular content is clearly culture-sensitive9: each society establishes 
its own conditions on what the relevant properties are that determine the valúes selected for 
each parameter. This explains why different cultures present radical differences in their 
politeness systems; and this explains also the misunderstandings in intercultural 
communication: what is polite (Le., adequate) in a given culture may be seen as rude in 
other communities. 
Politeness can be, thus, conceived of as a matter of social adequacy. Polite is the word 
we use to refer to a (linguistic) behaviour conforming to a given set of cultural norms: this 
is its central meaning; strategic uses of language should be parasitic on it. Only if a detailed 
characterisation is first provided of what counts as socially adequate can a proper account 
be offered for further-reaching manoeuvres. 
2.2. Politeness as social adequacy: How can it fit in RT? 
Now, if politeness is a matter of social adequacy and social adequacy is, in its tura, 
dependent on culture-specific norms, how can a psychological framework, such as RT, 
account for it? This question can be given, I think, a straightforward answer: if politeness 
is based on expectations, then it can be explained in terms of knowledge;10 if so, a 
psychological, cognitive framework will be able to account for it. 
In the previous section, I have suggested that having expectations on courses of events 
and on their social consequences is necessary to account both for default and strategic 
politeness. But what are expectations? Expectations can be seen as a particular kind of 
mental (meta)representations, one that relates a state or an event to another state or event 
on the basis of a causal relationship previously attested the more an expectation is 
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confirmed, the stronger it will become. The causal link can be natural or conventional: for 
instance, if I hold an apple in my hand and drop it, I expect that it will fall; similarly, if I do 
you a favour, I would probably expect that you expressed gratitude. The first expectation 
has a natural basis and belongs to naive physics; the second one depends on convention and 
has to do with politeness. 
Being mental representations, expectations are by definition a part of the individual's 
knowledge and since they are built and reinforced as the result of previous experience, 
they are a part of the individual's knowledge even in a stronger sense. However, it could 
be argued that this view is focusing on the individual side of expectations. What about their 
social side? 
Sperber's (1996) theory of culture as epidemiology of representations offers a suitable 
framework for explaining the relationship between what is individual and what is social: 
"Consider a social group (...). Each member of the group has, in his or her head, millions 
of mental representations, some short-lived, others stored in long-term memory and 
constituting the individual's 'knowledge'. Of these mental representations, some a 
very small proportion get communicated repeatedly, and end up being distributed 
throughout the group, and thus have a mental versión in most of its members. When we 
speak oí cultural representations, we have in mind or should have in mind such 
widely distributed, lasting representations." (Sperber, 1996: 33) 
Like other convention-based representations, expectations concerning social behaviour 
are not directly a result of examining "raw" facts, but rather of taking into account socially 
accepted interpretations (i.e., widely distributed metarepresentations) of facts.n Therefore, 
they will have the form of "a higher-level representation [which] describes (...) a type of 
lower-level representation and the conditions under which versions of it can be produced 
and distributed. "(Sperber, 1996: 30). As one can imagine, a number of social expectations 
will have to do with the use of certain linguistic expressions: those will contain a 
characterisation both of the expression and of the conditions under which it will be 
appropriate.n 
Being conventional and interpretive, the causal relationship cannot be merely inferred 
on the basis of regular patterns, but must be learned. As Janney & Arndt (1992: 30) put it, 
"growing up to become a normal member of a culture is largely a matter of learning how 
to perceive, think, and behave as others in the culture do." The immediate prediction is that 
conventions may differ from culture to culture: cultural variation can thus be seen as the 
result of the distribution of different sets of representations concerning both the embedded 
representation and the conditions that determine its appropriate uses. 
If seen as internal though widely distributed representations, expectations 
about linguistic behaviour fit easily in RT. Mental representations play indeed a major role 
in RT: the interpretation of any utterance involves, on the part of the hearer, the selection13 
of a particular subset of his assumptions14 in order to derive contextúa! effects (in the form 
of newly derived assumptions or of strengthening or weakening of existing assumptions). 
However, assumptions are not totally independent from one another: in fact, information 
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is usually stored as an organised set of related assumptions (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995: 
87-88). If so, expectations merely work inthe regular way: they make more accessible some 
related set of assumptions, which provides a ready-made context for interpretation. 
3. On the status of politeness within RT 
The question of how RT can explain politeness effects involves a reconsideration of a well-
known problem: What is the status of politeness? Is it always an implicature? Does it always 
constitute a message? 
Classical approaches to politeness those that see it as a conversacional strategy 
seemed to have taken for granted that it is the result of an implicature, in which the length 
of the inferential path represents the degree of politeness. But if politeness is conceived 
basically as a matter of social adequacy and crucially depends on expectations (i.e., on 
knowledge), one could wonder whether this characterisation would still apply. 
One of the main consequences of conceiving politeness effects as the result of an 
implicature is that it will always constitute a message and will be always communicated. The 
issue whether politeness is communicated has been recently addressed from a relevance-
theoretic perspective by Jary in a most interesting paper (Jary, in press). According to his 
proposal, a hearer can find that some aspects of the speaker's verbal behaviour are 
compatible or incompatible withhis assumptions (i.e., expectations) about the participants' 
relationship. If compatible, they "are not relevant enough to be worth the hearer's attention 
( = route (i))". If incompatible, they turn to be relevant enough to be worth the hearer's 
attention as evidence that the speaker holds him in higher or lower regard that he had 
assumed. Depending on whether he attributes intention to the speaker, four more 
possibilities of interpretation are obtained: Higher esteem, no attribution of intention = 
route (ii); higher esteem, plus attribution of intention = route (iii); lower esteem, no 
attribution of intention = route (iv); and lower esteem, plus attribution of intention = route 
(v). 
In Jary's proposal, the basic factors that explain the differences between all these routes 
of interpretation are the compatibility between expectations and actual linguistic behaviour 
on the one hand, and the attribution of intentionality to the speaker, on the other hand. Only 
in those cases in which the use of a linguistic form is seen as incompatible with expectations, 
and this incompatibility is seen as intentional by the hearer could it constitute a 
communicated assumption. Though I totally agree that those are indeed crucial factors, I 
am not as sure about the fact that (in)compatibility should totally determine the relevance 
ofan assumption. 
What I want to do in the next sections is to follow a slightly different path. I will begin 
by considering the relationship between politeness and relevance. Then, I will use the 
distinctions established in Wilson & Sperber (1993) regarding different ways of carrying 
assumptions as a starting point for a characterisation of different politeness phenomena and 
effects. 
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3.1. Conveying vs. communicating assumptions 
The distinctions proposed in Wilson & Sperber (1993) are central at this point. With every 
utterance a set of assumptions is made manifest. Presumably, some of diese assumptions 
will be salient enough to be worth the hearer's while, so they will be processed and 
interpreted. However, not all the assumptions conveyed by an utterance not even those 
that are found relevant need to have been ostensively communicated. 
For example, if you are a native speaker of Spanish, you could notice that I speak 
Spanish with a standard Madrid accent. Of course, this could perfectly go unnoticed as well. 
However, if you were to be asked about my accent, you could possibly remember what it 
was like. In addition, at a given time you could find it relevant for a number of different and 
unrelated reasons: if you are an Argentinian linguist looking for a speaker of European 
Spanish to test some data, this will constitute a convincing piece of evidence that I could be 
of some help to you; or you just could find the assumption that I am from Madrid strange, 
since it rnight contradict a previous assumption of yours that I am Catalán my family 
ñame is Catalán, so you could expect that I should have a Catalán accent instead. Both if you 
find the assumption that I am from Madrid relevant or not, you can conceivably guess that 
I am not intending to ostensively transmit it: it was not communicated by my utterance, but 
merely (unintentionally) conveyed by it. Thus only some of the assumptions that an 
utterance makes manifest are intentionally communicated. 
Suppose now that I want to get a role in a play for which an Argentinian actress is 
required, so I try and do my best to imitate an Argentinian accent. Although I am doing it 
intentionally, I probably would not intend that the cast director recognised that I am 
pretending. All my utterances will intentionally convey the (false) assumption that I am an 
Argentine, but the fulfilment of my purposes will require that I do it in a covert way. The 
intention to transmit a certain assumption is not a sufficient condition either for saying that 
it has been communicated. 
For real communication to take place, it is necessary that the transmission of 
assumptions is both intentional and overt, i.e., ostensive. Suppose now that I am speaking 
with my usual European Spanish accent and, at a given time, I begin to mimic an 
Argentinian accent; suppose also that, being a native speaker of Spanish, you can easily 
perceive and identify it. In this case, the change is both intentional and overt (mutually 
manifest), so it will cali your attention as a stimulus carrying a communicated assumption. 
An expectation of relevance will arise according to which you will be encouraged to search 
not just for a relevant interpretation, but for an optimally relevant one. For jjustance, I might 
have used it to overtly mark an utterance as an echoic representation attributed to a common 
friend who is from Argentina. Only in this latter case have we an example of ostensive 
communication. 
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3.2. Politeness, intentionality, and mutual manifestness 
What I want to argüe is that the distinction between these three forms of conveying 
infonnation (unintentional, intentional-and-covert, and intentional-and-overt) can be 
extended to the understanding of politeness effects. 
Take first the case in which a speaker uses a standard form that is perfectly adequate to 
the particular social situation. Suppose that, when being introduced to someone, the speaker 
utters How do you do?. Since the form is standard, the fact that she used it would 
presumably go unnoticed, and the hearer would discard processing any associate 
assumption.I5 Of course, if you would ask the hearer or a third party whether the speaker 
was polite, they could say she was indeed civil, socially correct. In some situations, the 
hearer could also find it relevant in some particular sense, and derive some conclusions: for 
instance, as mentioned before, if the speaker is a foreigner, the hearer can infer that she has 
mastered the social rules of his culture. In any event, the utterance does not communicate 
politeness, since there is no intention to do it on the part of the speaker. 
Suppose that the speaker fails to produce an adequate form: suppose, for instance, that 
having been asked How are you ?, she answered Praise to God. The occurrence of an 
unexpected stimulus one that contradicts a social expectation is usually a salient 
phenomenon and is very likely to cali the hearer's attention. He could process it as 
conveying different assumptions: if the speaker is a foreigner, he could imagine that she 
does not know the usual conventions of English; or he could suppose that she is a 
missionary... No matter what the interpretation is, if the intention to communicate it is not 
overt, the inadequacy of the utterance would be, at most, manifest to the hearer, but not 
mutually manifest, so communication would not take place either. 
On the other hand, if a speaker used a form that did not reflect the social situation 
according to her own understanding of it, but one that, she assumed, could suit the hearer's 
(or others') expectations, she would be in some sense pretending.16 Suppose she bates her 
interlocutor and has secretly decided not to speak to him anymore. Suppose also that at a 
particular time the speaker's job depends on the hearer, who is in a higher social position. 
In order to maintain her job, the speaker talks to her boss and even tries to be kind to him. 
In this kind of situation, her behaviour would be intentional; the existing mismatch, 
however, should necessarily be covert, so no particular message would nave been 
communicated either. The speaker would obtain the intended effect as long as the hearer did 
not discover such a mismatch.17 
Finally, if the speaker uses a form that contradicts previous assumptions on expected 
behaviour in an overt (mutually manifest) way, this will really constitute a genuine case of 
a communicated assumption,18 and it should presumably draw the hearer's attention. 
Imagine, for example, that a mother, after having called his son for dinner several times, 
utters something like Is his royal highness readyfor dinner?. Both mother and son know 
that, given the nature of their relationship, this is not a standard way of address. Being 
overt, this mismatch not only calis for an interpretation, but also triggers the presumption 
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that there should be an optimally relevant one.19 Only in this latter case can it be considered 
as a communicated assumption. 
My point is, thus, that the sense in which it can be said that an utterance communicates 
politeness (or impoliteness) is a very restricted one: only when (im)politeness is both 
intentional and overt can it transmit a communicated assumption; only in this case it comes 
with a presumption of relevance, so the hearer should pay attention to it because it promises 
an optimal balance between processing effort and cognitive effects. Otherwise, it will be at 
most a conveyed assumption, but will never constitute a communicated message. 
3.3. Relevance and politeness 
The distinctions suggested in the previous section seem to raise a further issue: When is 
politeness relevant? Is it relevant only when it is ostensively communicated? In the 
relevance-theoretic framework, an assumption is relevant in a context when it has some 
contextual effects in that context (Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995: 122). Thus, to yield 
contextual effects an assumption must enter an inferential process in which it combines with 
other assumptions. 
I will examine two sorts of situations in which politeness can be relevant without having 
been communicated. Consider fírst the case of the evaluation of politeness, that is, the fact 
that a hearer, or a third party, can provide usually upon request an evaluation of 
the politeness of a particular sequence uttered in some given circumstances. What he will 
do to characterise an utterance as polite or impolite is to use some of the assumptions 
conveyed by it to construct a higher-level explicature, under which he may also embed other 
levéis of explicature: for example, in certain situations an utterance like Get outl could give 
rise to a metarepresentation like The speaker asked me to leave (and he did it) in a very rude 
way. Consider now a different case, one in which the hearer spontaneously obtains some 
contextual effects. Suppose, for instance, that the use of a standard form by the speaker 
reinforces his previous assumption that she is learning quickly the conversational routines 
ofhis culture. 
Though they both involve inferential processes, neither of these facts involves 
communication of politeness. It is trae that, in both cases, the hearer brings into play some 
set of assumptions he draws from the utterance as premises for an inferential process. It is 
also trae that they happen to be relevant, since some contextual effects can be obtained at 
no unnecessary processing cost by taking them into account. But what the examples above 
show is merely that any assumption obtained from any source can feed an inferential 
process. And in fact, as one would reasonably foresee, this sort of effects is not unique to 
politeness. Any phenomenon, be it linguistic or not, could produce similar results: from 
lexical choices to pronunciation, or from body language to voice quality, any of such 
aspects can give rise to relevant cognitive effects.2" 
If so, the same reasoning can apply to the cases in which the hearer feels there is a 
mismatch between his expectations and the speaker's linguistic behaviour. He can interpret 
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the mismatch as strengthening his assumption that the speaker does not know how to behave 
properly; or as making íTianifest though not necessarily mutually manifest that she 
is being more polite than required by the situation. The 'failure' to produce a standard, 
default form may or may not be intentional on the side of the speaker. It can also be 
interpreted as intentional or not by the hearer.21 What is significant here is that it can be 
found relevant regardless of the fact of whether it is intentional or not , and that 
relevance is thus independent from the speaker's intentionality: in the definition of 
relevance nothing is said about the source of assumptions, or the properties of the 
phenomenon from which they were obtained. 
The fact that an assumption is used as a premise and found relevant does not entail that 
the assumption is an implicature of the utterance at least, in the strong sense22 , ñor 
does it entitle the hearer to suppose that the speaker wants to communicate this particular 
assumption. To properly qualify as an implicature in the strong sense an assumption must 
meet some other requirements, namely to have been both intentionally and ostensively 
communicated by the speaker. 
From these considerations a conclusión can be drawn: when some property of the 
utterance is associated to some expectation involving social relationships, both fulfilling and 
contradicting expectations can be found relevant.23 The relative salience of the phenomenon 
(especially, its incompatibility with existing assumptions) will favour the possibility that it 
would be taken into account.24 However, it could never fully determine it. 
A further prediction can be made. As suggested before, it is the overtness of a mismatch 
and not its mere existence what makes of it an instance of communication, and 
what carries a presumption of optimal relevance. If so, we can expect that also when an 
utterance fulfils the expectations, but does it in an overt way, some politeness effect will be 
obtained as well. This prediction is borne out. As Jary himself points out, if a teacher says 
to a class Couldyouplease be quiet? overtly stressing theplease, she is making mutually 
manifest "that she is behaving in accordance to the rules that govem their interaction and 
implicating that the pupils do the same." In fact, if we tend to think of (im)politeness effects 
as the result of a lack of correspondence between actual and expected behaviour it is only 
because we usually fmd it difficult to tura the use of a standard form into a stimulus with 
some overt salience, and not because there should be any a priori ban against such a 
possibility. 
4. Conclusión: Social adequacy, strategies and communication 
The considerations made in the previous sections have shown that the possibility of a 
strategic usage of linguistic forms with a social purpose is dependent on the existence of 
expectations about what can count as an adequate linguistic behaviour in a given situation. 
What is wrong with strategic approaches to politeness is not that strategic uses do not exist, 
but rather that all politeness phenomena are treated in terms of strategies: default uses are 
seenjust as particular cases of strategies, and therefore all politeness effects are instances 
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of implicature. As I have tried to suggest, this view misses two crucial distinctions: the one 
between intentional and non-intentional transraission of assumptions, and the one between 
overt and covert transmission of assumptions. 
Here is where Relevance Theory can contribute to the understanding of politeness. The 
relevance-theoretic framework offers useful tools for establishing those distinctions and for 
deriving explanatory consequences from them: it is intentionality that turns a usage into a 
strategy; and it is mutual manifestness that turns a conveyed assumption into a 
communicated assumption. Any overt departure from the expected basis will communicate 
an assumption, but also any overt use of a standard form could produce a similar effect: 
only in these situations, in which politeness is communicated, can we talk about 
implicatures. However, the strategic exploitations of a standard behaviour do not reduce to 
the cases of communicated assumptions. Also when the speaker covertly intends to make 
the hearer feel that they are in a relationship closer that expected (or more distant that 
assumed) we are dealing with a kind of strategic use of politeness, although no implicature 
is being overtly transmitted. 
On the side of the speaker intentionality is the key to distinguishing between the usage 
of a standard form (be it right or wrong) and the exploitation of expectations; by contrast, 
mutual manifestness is the notion that allows a distinction between merely conveying and 
actually communicating assumptions about social relationships. On the side of the hearer, 
only overtness guarantees the presumption of an optimally relevant interpretation. True, any 
phenomenon can draw the audience's attention and can be found relevant, no matter if it is 
adequate or not, no matter if it has been used intentionally or not; but the procedure itself 
is not ensured by ostensive communication. Any implication the hearer draws is obtained 
at his own risk. What is unique to real (ostensive) communication "the most important 
means by which the psychological tendency to maximise relevance is socially exploited" 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1997: 149) is that is also communicates a presumption of 
(cognitive) optimality. 
Notes 
* 1 am very grateful to M. Jary and M. Leonetti for their comments on a first draft on this 
paper, and also to A. Auchlin, N. Franken, M. Jary and V. Zegarac for their bibliographical help. 
Needless to say, all possible mistakes are my own responsibility. 
1. From the cognitive side, politeness phenomena and pragmatics have been considered as 
two very differentperspectives, with no particular connection between them. "There is no conflict 
between Leech's socio-pragmatics approach and the present psychological approach, because they 
are attempting to do different things. For this reason it is misleading to include phenomena like 
politeness, face-saving and turn-taking together with the phenomena discussed in the followtng 
chapters under the general heading of pragmatics." (Blakemore, 1992:47). 
2. See, for example, Jucker (1988), Clark [1994], Escandell-Vidal (1996), Jary (in press) 
and Jary (this volume), Zegarac (in press). 
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3. Or "to make possible communication between potentially aggressive parties" (Brown and 
Levinson, 1987:1). 
4. "Politeness is a state that one expects to exist in every conversation; participants note not 
that someone is being polite — this is the norm —, but rather that the speaker is violating the 
C[onversational] C|ontract]. Being polite does not involve making the hearer to 'feel good' á la 
Lakoff or Leech, ñor making the hearer not 'feel bad' a la B[rown] & L[evinson]. It simply 
involves getting on with tlie task at hand in light of the terms and conditions of the CC. The 
intention to be polite is not signalled, it is not implicated by some deviation(s) from the most 
'efficient' bald-on record way of using the language." (Fraser, 1990:233). 
5. See Held (1992), Watts, Ide & Ehlich (1992), or Werkhofer (1992), among others. In 
Escandell-Vidal (1996) I have presented a more detailed discussion of the points raised in this 
section. 
6. In the studies on politeness the word strategy is sometimes used in a sense that clearly 
differs from its everyday meaning. When talking about 'politeness strategies' or 'discourse 
strategies', pragmaticians usually refer to different linguistic ways of conveying a certain speech 
act: for instance, using an imperative, posing aquestion on the hearer's possibility or willingness 
to comply an action, or pointing to an unwanted state of affairs can count as different request 
strategies. Since most of the times the speaker cannot really choose among the different ways, 
but is compelled by the situation to select only one of these possibilities, I find the use of the 
word strategy in these contexts rather misleading. My use of strategy, on the other hand, will 
follow the standard usage and involve notions such as 'long-term planning'. 
7. This formulation is referred to as the 'conversational contract'. However, the use of the 
word 'contract' can be somewhat misleading, since it could suggest some previous, explicit or 
mandatory agreement between the two parties, which is not the case. Rather, it has more of a 
cognitive state than of a legal requirement. In fact, as Fraser (1990: 232) further explains, 
"During the course of time, or because of a change in the context, there is always the possibility 
for a renegotiation of the conversational contract: the two parties may readjust what rights and 
what obligations they hold towards each other". 
8. Its main task will be that of developing a coherent pichare of the self in society As 
Jackendoff (1992: 74) puts it, "each individual's participation in the culture must be supported 
by cognitive organisation in the individual's mind. (...) The way individuáis are capable of acting 
out within a society depends on the way they are capable of internally representing the social 
context." 
9. As several researchers have pointed out, Brown & Levinson's (1987) notion offace must 
be relativised: though intended as universal, in their original formulation it covered basically 
Anglo-Saxon social behaviour, but it was inadequate to account even for other Western cultures, 
let alone Eastern or African ones. Nevertheless, 1 think that this concept is still useful as a 
general notion summarising what is desirable for self- and other's image. 
10. In Escandell-Vidal (1996) I presented a more detailed discussion of this issue. 
11. Roughly in the sense developed in Searle (1995). 
12. The fact that an expectation has the form of a related pair might produce the ¡Ilusión that 
it constitutes a rule and, in fact, the members of the group can perceive it as such. However, 
as Searle (1995: Ch. 1) points out, conventions differ from rules in that they are arbitrary, while 
rules are motivated. Zegarac (in press) also suggest a distinction between standardisation and 
conventionalisation. 
56 Revista Alicantina de Estudios Ingleses 
13. This task is guided by the search of relevance. 
14. Assumptions are "conceptual representations treated by the individual as a representation 
of the actual world (as opposed to fictions or desires)." (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995:2) 
15. This case would correspond to Jary's (in press) route {i). 
16. This will be the case of Machiavellian manipulation noted by Jary (in press), which 
would correspond to some cases of route (ii). 
17. The reason why a speaker wants to conceal or not her intention depends on the extent to 
which the recognition of it would benefit her own plans. As Sperber (1994) points out, if you 
want to please someone, the recognition of your intention to please can reinforce the effect; but 
if you want to frighten somebody, the recognition of your intention will destroy the intended 
effect. 
18. This corresponds to Jary's routes (ii) and (iv). 
19. This presumption is not available in the previous cases, in which the assumption is not 
made mutually manifest. 
20. See Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995: 3.6) 
21. It depends on the sort of interpretive strategy the hearer uses. See Sperber (1994) for 
details 
22. For the distinction between strong and weak implicatures, see, Sperber & Wilson 
(1986/1995: 4.4) 
23. As Sperber & Wilson (1997: 149) put it, 
"For instance, non-ostensively produced evidence of deference or submission, or of 
expectations of deference or submission from others, is highly relevant and effective in 
maintaining or challenging power relationships." (Sperber & Wilson, 1997: 149) 
24. "Even in these non-ostensive cases, considerations of cognitive relevance determine the 
degree of manifestness achieved, and the likelihood that the information will be picked up, and 
therefore play a role in further interaction." (Sperber & Wilson , 1997: 149) 
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